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Abstract: David Miller has objected to the cosmopolitan argument that it is arbitrary and 
hence unfair to treat individuals differently on account of things for which they are not 
responsible. Such a view seems to require, implausibly, that individuals be treated 
identically even where (unchosen) needs differ. The objection is, however, inapplicable 
where the focus of cosmopolitan concern is arbitrary disadvantage rather than arbitrary 
treatment. This ‘unfair disadvantage argument’ supports a form of global luck 
egalitarianism. Miller also objects that cosmopolitanism is unable to accommodate 
special obligations generated by national membership. Cosmopolitanism can, however, 
accommodate many special obligations to compatriots. Those which it cannot 
accommodate are only morally compelling if we assume what the objection claims to 
prove – that cosmopolitanism is mistaken. Cosmopolitanism construed as global luck 
egalitarianism is therefore able to withstand both of Miller’s objections, and has 
significant independent appeal on account of the unfair disadvantage argument. 
 
Keywords: associative duties, cosmopolitanism, egalitarianism, global justice, luck, 
David Miller 
 
                                                 
*
 This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedited version of an article published in Theoria. The definitive 
publisher-authenticated version, ‘In Defence of Cosmopolitanism’, Theoria, 58 (2011), 19-34, is available 
online at: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/berghahn/theoria/2011/00000058/00000129/art00003. 
 2 
Introduction 
Weak cosmopolitanism requires that equal concern is shown for all persons in the world. 
Strong cosmopolitanism accepts this requirement but, crucially, adds another: that all 
persons must be subjected to equal treatment (in some strong sense).
1
 This is now the 
most common position taken by political philosophers writing on global justice, but it is 
far from universally accepted. Several writers defend positions which give some form of 
priority to compatriots (Rawls 1999; Blake 2001; Nagel 2005; Sangiovanni 2007). They 
accept weak cosmopolitanism,
2
 but see no injustice in there being inequality between 
nations or states, or between citizens in different nations or states, provided certain 
minimal conditions are met – typically, that all have the means for self-determination 
and/or certain decent minimums are upheld for all. 
In the course of his recent defence of such a position David Miller has presented 
two grounds for rejecting strong cosmopolitanism (hereafter: ‘cosmopolitanism’3). This 
article responds to the two problems with cosmopolitanism that Miller believes he has 
identified. It first considers the suggestion that the common argument for 
cosmopolitanism which attempts to combine weak cosmopolitanism with a rejection of 
morally arbitrary distributive influences yields counterintuitive implications where 
individual needs differ. It goes on to address the argument that cosmopolitanism cannot 
give due weight to the special obligations generated by national membership. In the 
course of responding to these two problems, an argument for a form of luck 
egalitarianism – the view that individuals’ advantage levels should be sensitive to their 
exercises of responsibility, or failing that equal – is presented and defended. If this 
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argument succeeds, it will have been shown that Miller’s objections are not strong 
grounds for rejecting cosmopolitanism. 
 
Arbitrariness and Advantage 
The ‘weak cosmopolitan premise’ is found in much work on global justice. According to 
Miller, Charles Beitz, Brian Barry, Thomas Pogge, and Kok-Chor Tan have all endorsed 
it in one form or another: ‘one formulation states that every human being has equal moral 
worth; another that every human being is equally an object of moral concern; yet another 
that we owe every human being impartial consideration of their claims upon us’.4 
Nevertheless, there is, on Miller’s view, an identifiable core to the weak cosmopolitan 
premise: 
 
What these formulations have in common is the idea that we owe all human 
beings moral consideration of some kind – their claims must count with us when 
we decide how to act or what institutions to establish – and also that in some sense 
that consideration must involve treating their claims equally (Miller 2007: 27, 
original emphasis). 
 
This ‘equal consideration principle’ seems uncontroversial. As Miller says, virtually 
everyone would accept that we can not give people of different races different medical 
treatment just because they belong to different races, and such blatantly unequal 
consideration of claims is ruled out by the principle. The principle ‘would be accepted by 
almost everyone (with the exception, perhaps, of a few extreme racists), so if that were all 
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strong cosmopolitanism meant, we could safely say that we are all cosmopolitans now’ 
(Miller 2007: 27; see also Brock & Brighouse 2005: 3). But of course cosmopolitans 
really want to say rather more: for instance, that justice requires global equal opportunity. 
Part of Miller’s argument against such cosmopolitan positions is that ‘whether such 
principles can be defended in their own terms, it is important to see that they cannot be 
derived from the weak cosmopolitan premise’ (Miller 2007: 28). 
 Cosmopolitans generally do not claim that their demanding principles of global 
justice can be derived in any strict sense from weak premises. Pogge, for instance, writes 
that ‘[t]he central idea of moral cosmopolitanism is that every human being has a global 
stature as an ultimate unit of moral concern. Such moral concern can be fleshed out in 
countless ways’ (Pogge 2008: 52). The cosmopolitans’ claim is that their positions follow 
when a weak cosmopolitan premise is combined with other stronger but still plausible 
premises. 
One argument of this sort starts with the weak cosmopolitan premise, and notes 
that it precludes discriminating against people on the grounds of race or sex. We might 
then flesh out the idea of treating claims equally by proposing an equal opportunity 
principle, of a sort widely accepted at a domestic level. The next move is to argue that ‘a 
person’s nationality is an irrelevant feature when we are considering what opportunities 
they should have, so the principle should be given a global application’ (Miller 2007: 31). 
We consider nationality as being ‘morally arbitrary’, like, say, hair colour is, and so our 
substantive norm of equal opportunity should apply globally (Caney 2001; Pogge 1989: 
247; Tan 2004: 27-8, 159-60; Moellendorf 2002: 55-6, 79). 
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 Miller believes he has a powerful objection to the arguments of this sort found in 
the literature. They rely upon an equivocation between (1) morally arbitrary in the sense 
of not being grounded in responsibility, which is the premise of such arguments, and (2) 
morally arbitrary in the sense of not being an appropriate basis for differential treatment, 
which is the conclusion of such arguments. What the cosmopolitan needs, Miller 
suggests, is a principle to link the premise to the conclusion. An obvious candidate is as 
follows: ‘if two people are differentiated only by features for which they are not morally 
responsible (arbitrariness in sense 1), then it is wrong that they should be treated 
differently (arbitrariness in sense 2)’.5 But Miller believes this principle is implausible. 
Suppose that there are differences in people’s needs that do not result from responsible 
action – for instance, that some people have congenital disabilities. In such a case it 
seems clear that people undifferentiated by responsibility considerations are nevertheless 
due differential treatment, for ‘[v]irtually everyone thinks that people with greater needs 
should be given greater resources’ (Miller 2007: 33). This shows, Miller believes, that 
just because nationality is ‘happenstance’, does not mean it is as morally irrelevant as 
hair colour; nationality could be a morally relevant happenstance, like need. 
I believe that the argument from moral arbitrariness is only hamstrung by the 
needs objection where the argument relies on an unnecessarily implausible distributive 
principle. The key move in resisting the objection is to revise the second sense of morally 
arbitrary. The relevant sense of morally arbitrary is not (2) morally arbitrary in the sense 
of not being an appropriate basis for differential treatment, but rather (2’) morally 
arbitrary in the sense of not being an appropriate basis for unequal levels of advantage. 
 6 
Here I use ‘advantage’ as Miller does, referring to ‘some neutral currency … in terms of 
which a principle of global equality can be couched’ (Miller 2007: 68).  
Changing the focus from when ‘differential treatment’ is unjustified to when 
‘unequal levels of advantage’ are unjustified gives the arbitrariness argument the tools to 
meet Miller’s challenge regarding needs. Different needs require, in his terms, differential 
treatment, but they do not require unequal levels of advantage – indeed, one reason why 
they might require differential treatment is presumably to secure equal levels of 
advantage. There is consequently nothing implausible about claiming that ‘if two people 
are differentiated only by features for which they are not responsible (arbitrariness in 
sense 1), then it is wrong that they should have unequal levels of advantage (arbitrariness 
in sense 2’)’. There may, as before, be differences in people’s needs that do not result 
from responsible action (arbitrariness in sense 1). But on the reformulated position there 
is nothing wrong about this difference in needs being reflected in a difference in how 
people are treated, provided it results in equal levels of advantage. In fact, for 
arbitrariness in sense 2’ to arise in this case, there would have to be unequal levels of 
advantage, and the most straightforward way in which this could happen would be for all 
people to be treated in the same way, in spite of the difference in needs. The revised 
position is, then, not only consistent with catering to different needs, but actually makes it 
a condition of appropriate treatment that people’s needs are taken into account, so that 
people who are not differentiated on responsibility do not have different advantage levels. 
This change to focusing on (in)equality of advantage rather than (in)equality of 
treatment is far from ad hoc. Perhaps the best known theory of equality to be developed 




 Cases where different individuals exercise their responsibility 
equivalently, and cases where different individuals do not exercise their responsibility, 
justify equality of advantage. Cases where different individuals exercise their 
responsibility non-equivalently justify inequality of advantage. The relevant point, then, 
is that reformulating the argument from arbitrariness leads us to the established luck 
egalitarian position that inequalities in advantage can only be justified by interpersonal 
differences in how responsibility has been exercised. This move would be desirable even 
if it was not necessary to avoid Miller’s needs-based argument. The original version of 
the arbitrariness argument lead us to the unappealing position that inequalities in 
treatment, even those necessary to secure equality of advantage, need to be justified by 
responsibility considerations. No luck egalitarian has defended a position like that.  
It is also important to note that, although differences in needs are now allowed 
for, differences in nationality are not allowed for. Where two persons differ in nationality, 
and are not responsible for this, the argument says that inequality in their levels of 
advantage is not morally appropriate. Of course, if people from one country (an East 
African country during a famine, say) have greater needs than those of another country (a 
Western European country, say), then we will need to give more resources to the first 
people in order to ensure equality of advantage. But that manoeuvre places no weight on 
nationality per se. This is just the result the cosmopolitan is looking for. 
 More formally stated, the revised argument, or arbitrary disadvantage argument 
as I will refer it, looks like this: 
 
Premise 1: All persons are to be subject to equal consideration. 
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Premise 2: Equal consideration implies that persons are not disadvantaged on the 
basis of race or sex. 
Premise 3: The feature of race and sex which is necessary and sufficient for 
persons not being subject to equal consideration when they are disadvantaged on 
the basis of race and sex is that persons are not agent responsible for their race or 
sex. 
Conclusion: No person should be disadvantaged on the basis of things for which 




I believe that the arbitrary disadvantage argument provides a plausible basis for an 
egalitarian form of cosmopolitanism.
8
 If the premises are accepted, the Conclusion seems 
to follow naturally. Miller accepts Premise 1 (the weak cosmopolitan premise) and 
Premise 2 (which he presents as an implication of the weak premise). The most 
controversial part of the argument is undoubtedly Premise 3, but it is not obviously 
wrong. If we try to separate features which people may, consistent with equal 
consideration, be disadvantaged on the basis of, from features which people may not, 
consistent with equal consideration, be disadvantaged on the basis of, the dividing line 
does seem to mirror an intuitive divide between responsibility and non-responsibility: on 
the one hand we have time spent working, intensity of effort, and quality of decision-
making; on the other hand we have race, sex, religion, and class. While the last of these, 
at least, may be, to some extent, subject to individual choice – where, in a meritocratic 
society, one of a lowly background attains education and employment associated with 
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higher classes – it may be thought that, insofar as choice actually has this impact, class 
slides over the line, and becomes a legitimate basis for inequality.  
There may be some features, such as political or even religious beliefs, which 
people may become responsible for, by consciously seeking out ideological or holy texts, 
or attending meetings of like-minded people, which nevertheless strike us as an 
inappropriate basis for inequality. But the relevant point is that, even if someone is 
responsible for their beliefs, they can only form the basis for inequality where they result 
in other conditions being satisfied. If someone adopts a political or religious belief which 
means they work harder or less hard, or have a different level of risk aversion, then the 
basis for inequality will be their agent responsibility for the benefits and burdens that 
their responsible actions bring about. But if their belief does not affect their conduct in 
that way then, though they are responsible for it, it will not affect their distributive share.  
I In short, a cosmopolitanism grounded in the arbitrariness of basing distributions 
on things for which people are not responsible has some promise. Miller remarks, on 
rejecting the original arbitrariness argument, that ‘we have yet to be given a reason why it 
is wrong if people are better or worse off on account of their national membership’ 
(Miller 2007: 33). But there is a prima facie case for saying that it is at least often wrong 
if people are better or worse off on account of their national membership. It is that (a) no 
person should be disadvantaged on the basis of things for which they are not agent 
responsible, and (b) national membership is something for which people are not usually 
agent responsible. Miller is right that cosmopolitanism cannot be ‘derived’ from the weak 
premise, or as he puts it elsewhere that ‘strong cosmopolitanism is not entailed by weak 
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cosmopolitanism’ (Miller 2007: 50). But the weak premise can be part of an appealing 
argument for a form of full-blown cosmopolitanism.  
 
Special Obligations 
Another argument for rejecting cosmopolitanism that Miller presents is that it fails to 
give due weight to national membership. The argument ‘is an attempt to defeat strong 
versions of cosmopolitanism by showing that nations are indeed communities of the kind 
that can support special obligations’ (Miller 2007: 34). Two key steps are made: first, it is 
asserted that human attachments can generate special obligations; second, it is maintained 
that national membership is a kind of attachment that can satisfy the three necessary 
conditions for special obligations.  
 Just any special obligations will not do for Miller’s argument.9 If there are special 
obligations, but the fundamental moral grounds for them are cosmopolitan, then the 
argument will not get off the ground. Miller acknowledges that ‘strong cosmopolitans can 
of course recognise and endorse special obligations to compatriots where it can be shown 
that acting on these is the most effective means of bringing about global justice’ (Miller 
2007: 31n.12). Robert Goodin, for instance, regards special duties ‘as being merely 
“distributed general duties”’, deriving ‘the whole of their moral force from the moral 
force of those general duties’ (Goodin 2008: 272). The duties that state agents have 
towards their citizens are ‘[a]t root … merely the general duties that everyone has 
towards everyone else worldwide’ (Goodin 2008: 274). On this view, special duties are 
assigned to those with particular attachments with others (family members, compatriots) 
simply because that is the best (for instance, most efficient or most fulfilling) way for 
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general duties to be upheld. For instance, there might be general duties to raise young 
children that are best allocated to parents, who will care more reliably and 
wholeheartedly for their offspring than non-relatives would. These derivative special 
obligations will not do for Miller’s purposes as he intends to establish national 
membership as the fundamental basis for (some) obligations, not just as a convenient way 
of distributing obligations that have a purely cosmopolitan moral basis. So both steps of 
Miller’s argument must refer not just to special obligations, but to morally fundamental 
special obligations. 
 Miller’s argument must also refer to what we might call lexically prior justicial 
special obligations. A justicial obligation is an obligation the fulfilment of which is a 
matter of justice, which both Miller and myself take as implying consistency with equal 
consideration. For instance, it would typically be thought a matter of justice that a state 
ensures its citizens are educated, but not a matter of justice that parents promote their 
child’s upbringing, even if they are so obliged. A lexically prior justicial special 
obligation is an obligation the fulfilment of which is among the first priorities of justice. 
For instance, Rawls famously argued that the basic liberties had lexical priority over 
distributive justice, so on that account the state’s obligations to uphold basic liberties 
would be lexically prior (Rawls 1972). The relevance of this distinction is shown by 
Tan’s position that ‘cosmopolitan justice, properly understood, can provide the limiting 
conditions for nationalist aspirations and patriotic commitments, and that it can do so 
without denying the moral significance of such particular ties and obligations’.10 This 
position allows that special obligations based on nationality are morally fundamental (see 
Tan 2004: ch. 9; Abizadeh & Gilabert 2008). But Miller still needs to resist it because it 
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in effect grants lexical priority to cosmopolitan justice – we can only consider special 
obligations once cosmopolitan obligations are satisfied – and is therefore consistent with 
the (strong) cosmopolitan requirement of substantively equal treatment. Just ‘showing 
that nations are indeed communities of the kind that can support special obligations’ is 
not enough to ‘defeat strong versions of cosmopolitanism’, even if those obligations are 
fundamental. Miller in addition requires that those obligations are treated as a matter of 
justice, and as among the first priorities of justice: if they were non-justicial, or justicial 




 A final preliminary is that Miller’s argument must refer to extensive special 
obligations. By this I mean special obligations which are sufficiently far-reaching to 
conflict with cosmopolitanism’s obligations. More specifically, I interpret special 
obligations as being extensive where their full set cannot be satisfied simultaneously with 
the full set of baseline general obligations (those that would be held absent any special 
obligations). Samuel Scheffler considers the position that ‘the acquisition of special 
responsibilities to some people leaves unchanged both the content and strength of one’s 
general responsibilities to other people’ (Scheffler 2001: 86). If Miller was only able to 
establish special obligations of this sort, he would have presented no case against (strong) 
cosmopolitanism. Suppose, for example, that he could establish that there was a special 
obligation to contribute to the upkeep of a welfare state to assist co-nationals in certain 
ideal circumstances of greatly increased equality (see Seglow 2010: 70-1). Even if this 
special obligation was fundamental, and even if it was lexically prior justicial, 
cosmopolitanism could accommodate it as the obligation to support a national welfare 
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state is not at odds with the baseline general obligations of many cosmopolitan theories 
where global equality has already been realised. 
If Miller’s argument is successful in the terms described above, we will have 
grounds on which to resist the arbitrary disadvantage argument for global luck 
egalitarianism presented above. Specifically, we will be able to resist Premise 3, which 
holds that the feature of race and sex which is necessary and sufficient for persons not 
being subject to equal consideration when they are disadvantaged on the basis of race 
and sex is that persons are not agent responsible for their race or sex. The premise will 
be threatened by the success of Miller’s argument because such success establishes that a 
person being disadvantaged on the basis of something for which they are not agent 
responsible is not necessary and sufficient person for that person having been denied 
equal consideration. If Miller’s argument succeeds, equal consideration will be consistent 
with at least one form of responsibility-insensitive disadvantaging, namely the 
disadvantaging that arises where one person is made worse off than another due to the 
latter benefitting from co-nationals discharging their special obligations towards them. 
The main task of this section is to raise doubts about whether the first step of 
Miller’s argument, revised to accommodate the above preliminaries, can deliver the 
claimed refutation of cosmopolitanism. Our question is whether human attachments can 
generate fundamental, lexically prior justicial, and extensive special obligations. All 
further unqualified reference to special obligations must be taken to refer to lexically 
prior justicial and extensive special obligations. An explicit distinction between 
fundamental and derivative special obligations will, however, be central to the discussion. 
I will first argue that, in National Responsibility and Global Justice, Miller fails to 
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establish that there are any fundamental special obligations. I then go on to suggest that, 
though Miller’s earlier work suggests that certain familiar nationally-derived obligations 
would have to be grounded fundamentally if it all, the cosmopolitan can plausibly deny 
the existence of such duties. 
Miller says that he will be assuming that some attachments can generate special 
obligations. He writes that his argument ‘does not address those who think that there can 
be no local duties, duties not owed to humanity at large, not even within family groups’ 
(Miller 2007: 34). The apparent explanation for this is that ‘most cosmopolitans are 
willing to accept such duties’ (Miller 2007: 34) when presented with examples such as 
the following: 
 
Suppose a child goes missing and there are fears for her safety. This is equally 
bad no matter whose child it is, and there are some agents, for instance the police, 
who should devote equal resources to finding the child in all cases. But there are 
other agents whose reasons for action will depend on their relationship to the 
child. If the child is mine, then I have a strong reason, indeed an overwhelming 
reason, to devote all my time and energy to finding her – a moral reason, to be 
clear, not merely a strong desire, by virtue of our special relationship. If the child 
comes from my village, then I have a stronger reason to contribute to the search 
than I would have in the case of a child from another community (Miller 2007: 
29, original emphasis). 
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 It may be true that most cosmopolitans would accept that there are special 
obligations in a case like this. But we are given very little to make us think that the 
special obligations those close to the child have are fundamental, i.e. not merely Goodin’s 
‘devices whereby the moral community’s general duties get assigned to particular agents’ 
(Goodin 2008: 272). It is not too much to suppose that the moral community has duties to 
protect children. Nor is it much of a leap to suggest that, if you want to protect children, it 
is better to assign the most demanding duties to the child’s parents and local people. If 
these demanding duties were instead assigned to outsiders, and family and friends 
socialised to believe that they had to do no more to look for a child close to them than to 
one on the other side of the country, the efforts made to look for the child would be much 
less thorough. Even if the letter of the demanding duties – fields were combed for so 
many hours a day, appeals were made to the media, and so on – was begrudgingly 
followed by strangers the standard of their performance, and their contribution to 
protecting children, would be much lower. Of course, the best case scenario as regards 
protection of a particular missing child would be for everyone to (be under the duty to) 
devote themselves to looking for the child. But the moral community’s duties of child 
protection are not so strong that they extend to grinding a county or a country to a halt. 
So the best way of assigning the general duties of child protection, consistent with other 
duties (for instance, maintaining a competitive economy), is to assign weak general duties 
to all (to use Miller’s example, to require anyone to pass relevant information on to the 
police), and stronger special duties to those in certain professional roles and those 
biologically or geographically close to the child. 
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Miller does not, as far as I can tell, describe any argument for thinking that the 
special duties of parents and the local community are fundamental rather than derivative 
on general duties. This seems like a strange omission, given his recognition that 
derivative special duties in the international context are insufficient for his purposes. 
Miller’s argument does not only, as he admits, disregard the minority position among 
cosmopolitans that there are no local duties; it also ignores the majority position among 
cosmopolitans that there are special, local duties, but that these are derivative on 
worldwide duties. Those two positions are exhaustive of (consistent) cosmopolitan 
stances on special duties, so to assume that they are wrong is to assume that 
cosmopolitanism is wrong. 
This lacuna in Miller’s argument might be thought attributable to the fact that he 
had already, in On Nationality, examined the position that duties to compatriots are 
derivative.
12
 Describing Goodin’s position as an example of ‘the “useful convention” 
method of getting from universal duties to particular ones’ (Miller 2008a: 286), Miller 
acknowledges that some particular duties are indeed useful conventions for achieving 
general duties. For instance, the general duty to save struggling swimmers can be 
effectively acted upon by assigning particular duties to lifeguards. But this is because 
lifeguards are capable swimmers with specialised training, which makes them especially 
well equipped to pull strugglers out of the sea and remove water from their lungs. There 
is no comparable specialisation among any particular individual’s co-nationals, so it is 
hard to see how taking special responsibility for one’s compatriots can be justified as the 
best way of satisfying universal duties. For while people may have a certain advantage, 
due to cultural similarities, in identifying the needs of their compatriots, this is 
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counterbalanced by the fact that assigning special responsibilities to compatriots is a 
highly inefficient way of using resources from a general perspective. For instance, ‘[t]o 
put Swedes, with a per capita annual income of $24,000, in charge of their own needy, 
and Somalians, with a per capita income of $120, in charge of their needy would seem 
grossly irrational from a universal standpoint’ (Miller 2008a: 292). Miller concludes that 
universalists – or cosmopolitans as he now refers to them – cannot assign moral worth to 
nationality indirectly, as serving general duties. If we want to assign moral value to 
nationality then we would do better to do so directly, as he proposes. 
This argument has some appeal. But can it be used to establish the first step of the 
argument against cosmopolitanism (the claim that human attachments can generate 
fundamental special obligations)? It is pretty clear that it cannot. As Miller admits, it is 
only an argument against those cosmopolitans who think they can find a derivative moral 
basis for nationality. A cosmopolitanism which says that special obligations are grounded 
in general duties, and that nationality does not give rise to special obligations, is not 
addressed by Miller’s argument. 
The argument so far is that Miller’s argument begs the question. His argument is 
that cosmopolitanism fails because it does not allow national membership to give rise to 
special obligations. But for this argument to get off the ground, he must mean that 
cosmopolitanism cannot give rise to special obligations of nationality that are morally 
fundamental. Some evidence for the existence of special obligations is given, but no 
evidence for the existence of fundamental special obligations of nationality is presented. 
Miller simply assumes that such obligations exist, and in so doing assumes what he 
claims to be demonstrating – the ‘defeat’ of cosmopolitanism. 
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One last attempt to resuscitate Miller’s argument proceeds as follows. The second 
step of Miller’s argument in National Responsibility and Global Justice unfolds as an 
attempt to show that national membership satisfies three conditions for attachments to 
legitimately ground special duties (Miller 2007: 36-43; see also Child 2009). It may seem 
that, if there can be no such thing as fundamental special obligations, then it is beside the 
point whether national membership satisfies the three conditions of being intrinsically 
valuable, of entailing duties intrinsic to the relationship, and of not being founded on 
injustice. At most it will have been shown that national membership can ground special 
obligations, and that is not enough as special obligations may be derived from general 
duties. But I have already allowed that there is some plausibility to the argument of On 
Nationality that if we are to assign weight to nationality, it must be on fundamental 
grounds. So pulling the two strands of argument together we have (i) that national 
membership can ground special obligations, and (ii) that, if national membership can 
ground special obligations, those obligations must be fundamental. Unless one or both of 
these positions can be resisted, we appear to have a solid argument for saying that 
national membership can ground fundamental special obligations, and hence that 
cosmopolitanism is mistaken. 
I do not want to dispute (i). Although I would reject Miller’s account of why 
national membership is a basis for special obligations, it seems likely to me that some 
cosmopolitan account that gives instrumental value to special obligations and/or makes 
them non-justicial and/or non-lexically prior and/or non-extensive might succeed. In spite 
of its initial appeal, it is (ii) that I would challenge.  
 19 
Miller is right to say that, if national membership can ground special obligations 
like those which are commonly attributed to compatriots, those obligations must be 
fundamental. But the italicised qualification is crucial, for Miller offers no real support 
for the stronger claim that, if national membership can ground special obligations at all, 
those obligations must be fundamental. We might take the position that Swedes have 
special obligations to other Swedes, but that these are weaker than is commonly 
supposed. Perhaps these obligations are purely expressive in content (for example, 
Swedes might owe other Swedes expressions of national solidarity that they do not owe 
Somalis); or perhaps these obligations concern the legal and political framework of the 
country (for example, Swedes might be obliged to be jurors or witnesses when the 
Swedish justice system requests it, but can ignore similar requests from Somalia). 
Miller’s argument would not touch positions of this kind as they are consistent with 
Swedes having as much of an obligation to meet the material needs of Somalis as they do 
to meet those of Swedes. The special obligations described by such positions are, in the 
terms introduced above, non-extensive – they do not conflict with general obligations.13 
(The expressive special obligations are probably also non-justicial and non-lexically 
prior.) These positions acknowledge the point that Swedes are culturally better equipped 
to help other Swedes than they are to help Somalis, without following that point to what 
Miller notes is an untenable conclusion for the cosmopolitan: that Swedes should 
prioritise helping those Swedes who are (relative to other Swedes) economically needy, 
even though Somalis are generally in far greater economic need. The crucial point, then, 
is that Miller has not shown that there are obligations of justice grounded in nationality 
which are extensive enough to conflict with cosmopolitan obligations. Swedish duties to 
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financially assist Swedes would be extensive enough, but it is highly plausible, especially 
to cosmopolitans, that Swedes are under no such duties. 
It is possible to defuse Miller’s objection to the position that nationally-grounded 
special obligations derive from general obligations by decoupling nationally-grounded 
special obligations from practices which are rooted in, and perpetuate, huge international 
inequalities (see Tan 2004: 144-6). There are few cosmopolitans for whom that 
decoupling would be problematic – indeed, it would be a natural result of applying 
equality globally, as many cosmopolitans propose. For instance, were we to endorse the 
luck egalitarian view that people are not subject to equal consideration where they are 
disadvantaged on the basis of things for which they are not responsible, it would be clear 
that poor Swedes could not be given priority over poorer Somalis on account of being 
Swedes, because Somalis are not (at least usually) responsible for being Somalis.
14
  So I 
deny that special obligations grounded in national membership must be fundamental as 
(ii) suggests, and see no problem in the cosmopolitan accepting (i) that national 
membership can ground special obligations. Premise 3 of the arbitrary disadvantage 
argument is secure because it has not been shown that disadvantaging of people on 
account of things for which they are not responsible, such as nationality, is required for 
us to handle special obligations in a plausible way. 
The suggestion that cosmopolitanism should be rejected on account of its inability 
to accommodate special obligations has some intuitive appeal. Cosmopolitanism can, 
however, accommodate many special obligations – specifically, all of those which are 
either derivative, or non-lexically prior, or non-justicial, or non-extensive, or any 
combination of these. The goal for the critic of cosmopolitanism is therefore to identify 
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special obligations which have none of these features. It is easy to identify special 
obligations, but very hard – perhaps impossible – to keep all of these features out without 
assuming the falsity of cosmopolitanism. That falsity is supposed to be the conclusion of 
Miller’s argument, not its premise. 
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that Miller’s criticisms of cosmopolitanism do not threaten its coherence or 
appeal where the view is stated in one of its stronger forms. The needs problem does not 
undermine moral arbitrariness as a basis for cosmopolitanism where a global form of luck 
egalitarianism is assumed. The special obligations problem implicitly assumes that 
special obligations are fundamental, and as cosmopolitanism is inconsistent with 
fundamental special obligations, this is not so much an argument against 
cosmopolitanism as a bare assumption against it. An extension of the argument points to 
the apparent existence of fundamental national obligations where, for example, people in 
rich countries are obligated to help their co-nationals, but such obligations are not 
plausible from a cosmopolitan perspective. As proof that special obligations of the 
relevant sort can exist has not been provided, the thought that discrimination based on 
race or sex is inconsistent with equal consideration because it disadvantages people on 
the basis of things for which they are not responsible remains tenable. I have maintained 
that that thought is the key part of a plausible argument for global luck egalitarianism. 
 None of this is to say that Miller’s critique of cosmopolitanism is without merit. 
He successfully challenges certain arguments for cosmopolitanism, such as the original 
arbitrariness argument, which refers to differential treatment rather than disadvantage. He 
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shows cosmopolitanism to be a more demanding doctrine than some of its adherents 
might like, ruling out some familiar national obligations. It is also true that he has some 
effective specific criticisms of forms of global egalitarianism other than my favoured luck 
egalitarianism which I have been able to disregard here (Miller 2007: ch. 3; see also 
Knight 2012). Miller’s higher ambition of undermining cosmopolitanism itself is 
unsuccessful, as it follows from the plausibility of one form of cosmopolitanism that the 
problem with other forms of cosmopolitanism is not their cosmopolitanism. But Miller’s 
ambition is unsuccessful in an enlightening way. By drawing on assumptions very 
different to those of cosmopolitans, the critique lays bare the deep methodological and 
substantive assumptions of cosmopolitanism. Miller says that he is open to Leif Wenar’s 
‘suggestion that I should appeal to the value to individuals of national self-determination 
as a way of countering arguments for global equality if my direct attack on the latter 
value should fail’ (Miller 2008b: 566; see also Wenar 2008). The direct attack seems to 
have failed, but Miller can still resist cosmopolitanism by confronting it with a rival set of 
basic values. 
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1. Miller 2007: 43-4. Both strong and weak cosmopolitanism are forms of ‘moral 
cosmopolitanism’, which ‘in its most general formulation, says simply that human beings 
are all subject to the same moral laws’; ‘political cosmopolitanism’, by contrast, ‘says 
that this can be achieved only if everyone is ultimately subject to the same authority with 
the power to enforce these laws’ (2007: 24). 
2. For example, a country cannot just dump its nuclear waste on foreign soil, with no 
regard to the interests of the foreigners thereby disadvantaged (Miller 2007: 27-8). 
3. Miller sees strong cosmopolitanism as the position taken by self-identifying 
cosmopolitans (see 2007: 28), and refers to his position as, in Charles Beitz’s (1999) 
terms, a form of ‘social liberalism’ rather than ‘cosmopolitan liberalism’ (2007: 20-1), 
even though it endorses weak cosmopolitanism. I hope, then, that the presentational 
convenience of using cosmopolitanism unqualified to refer to strong cosmopolitanism 
does not seem jarring. Tan (2004: 151-2) takes the similar strategy of referring to 
cosmopolitanism and ‘restricted cosmopolitanism’. 
4. Miller 2007: 27. See Beitz 1998: 830-1; Beitz 2005: 17; Barry 1999: 35-6; Pogge 
2002: 169-70; Tan 2004: 1, 94. 
5. Miller 2007: 33. Although Miller refers to moral responsibility here, that does not 
seem to be needed for morally arbitrary inequality to be averted. When one person works 
harder than another, purely motivated by self-interest, on some views they could not 
thereby be morally responsible for their extra productivity, even if they are agent 
responsible for it. As Miller recognizes elsewhere (2007: 90, 100-1), accounts of 
distributive justice which are sensitive to responsibility and choice need not be in the 
business of basing distributions on moral responsibility; agent responsibility (or ‘outcome 
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responsibility’, as he calls it) is enough. For this reason I refer to ‘agent responsibility’ 
later in the text. 
6. Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989; Knight 2009a. Though Dworkin (2003) refuses the label 
of ‘luck egalitarian’, Dworkin 2000: ch. 2 remains the main inspiration for luck 
egalitarianism. 
7. The argument maintains only that equal consideration is sometimes inconsistent with 
inequality. An extended and (I would say) more fully luck egalitarian version of the 
argument would also hold that equal consideration is inconsistent with equality where 
there have been non-equivalent exercises of responsibility. I leave this aside as a 
complication which is unnecessary for present purposes, especially given that some luck 
egalitarians defend equality even where there have been non-equivalent exercises of 
responsibility; see Segall 2010: ch. 1. 
8. For the argument that luck egalitarianism is indeed substantively egalitarian, see 
Knight 2009b. 
9. Like Miller, I will use ‘duties’ and ‘obligations’ interchangeably. Rawls’ (1972: 114) 
distinction between obligations, which are acquired voluntarily, and ‘natural duties’, is 
absent in Miller’s argument. What I am referring to as special duties (or obligations) are 
often called special responsibilities or associative duties. 
10. Tan 2004: 2-3. Arash Abizadeh and Pablo Gilabert (2008: 351) make the similar 
claim that ‘special responsibilities, like general duties, arise within the framework of 
cosmopolitan egalitarianism’ . 
11. Tan usually says that cosmopolitanism or global justice limit special obligations, 
which leaves it ambiguous whether those obligations are non-justicial, or justicial but not 
 25 
matters of global justice. He seems to agree with Miller’s claim that there is a conflict 
between global and domestic justice, although unlike Miller he grants priority to global 
justice (2004: 191-3; see Miller 2000: 167-70), which supports the justicial interpretation. 
But elsewhere Tan implies the non-justicial interpretation: ‘once the requirements of 
justice are met, partial concern for compatriots … is not only to be expected but is 
unreasonable to deny’ (2004: 159). Whichever is Tan’s favoured interpretation, Miller 
must resist it. 
12. Miller 1995: ch. 3; reprinted as Miller 2008a. 
13. It is arguable that Miller’s positive view does not describe extensive special 
obligations. His approaches to mediating global and special duties, implementing fair 
terms of cooperation, and securing the subsistence of distant others are all rather vague; 
see Brock 2008: 440-44. 
14. Niko Kolodny (2002) suggests that special and general duties, properly specified, will 
not conflict. The idea as applied to the present case is that acting on a special duty by 
prioritizing monetary aid to my fellow Swede simply passes part of my general duty to 
assist Somalis on to my compatriot. I am far from convinced by this argument. My 
general duty is most plausibly construed as one to ensure that Somalis are assisted, and as 
a matter of urgency. If I give my disposable income to a compatriot it is less than certain 
that they will pass it on, and even if it is it will be unduly delayed. I suggest that both of 
these features show that I have acted contrary to my general duty, just as I would have if 
my aid to Somalia took the form of high denomination bills stuffed into a second-class 
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